

more for technical and budgetary reasons, but not due to the impediments caused by the ABM treaty."

In other words, the United States can continue with an aggressive NMD development and testing program for the foreseeable future, should the Administration and Congress choose to, without the need to abandon the ABM.

I do not believe that arms control treaties and agreements are a panacea that, by themselves, secure U.S. national security interests or those of our friends and allies.

But surely the constraints that these treaties and agreements impose can play a valuable role in constricting the development of weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation around the globe.

They are a useful tool in a fully articulated foreign policy and national security toolbox, and it is short-sighted, to say the least, to throw the tool out. Especially if one does not replace it with something of equal or greater value.

Although the technical challenges of developing missile defense technology are great, I believe that the United States, if we choose to pursue it, is equal to the task.

But that we can develop a missile defense system should not be confused by anyone to mean that we have the capabilities now, or will possess them, even with an aggressive testing and development program, anytime soon.

Effective missile defense is an enormous technical challenge. Commonly compared to "hitting a bullet with a bullet," missile defense requires interceptors to find and hit the warheads of long-range missiles traveling at speeds of 15,000 mph or more. Although two of the four tests thus far have failed, and serious questions have been raised about the degree of success of the other two, these tests have indicated that it may indeed be possible to "hit a bullet with a bullet."

But it is still far from clear if it can be done reliably in a real-world setting, where decoys and countermeasures will complicate the system's ability to determine what targets need to be hit. A global system of satellites, radars, communications relays, booster rockets and interceptors all must work with each other almost perfectly for the defense to have a chance of success.

There are also concerns, first raised by the November 1999 Welch Report, that political pressure to deploy a system regardless of whether the science works or not may lead to a "rush to failure." However, it must be a scientific determination, not a political determination, that decides how far and how fast we go forward with missile defense.

If the United States goes forward with development and deployment of a missile defense system, it must be one that is fully tested and deemed operationally effective in a real world setting. Anything less would be an invitation to disaster.

My final concern about missile defense relates to the potential costs of development and deployment.

As Congress considers this issue it is critical that it is able to clearly prioritize missile defense programs and spending, within the context of our larger national security needs. Funds that are spent on national missile defense are, in effect, funds that can not be spent on other priority programs, such as homeland defense. I do not propose that the United States spends all on one or the other. Rather, Congress must play a responsible role in making sure that sufficient funds are available to meet the threats to national security that exist today, while planning prudently for threats that will emerge tomorrow.

To allocate a disproportionate share of defense spending on a threat that does not exist at all, or which will not be real until much further off in the future creates a very real risk to those programs that need to be funded today. This means that immediate and concrete threats we face today may not be addressed with potentially disastrous results.

There has never been a consensus cost figure for deploying an NMD system. For several years, the Clinton administration estimated that a limited NMD system would cost \$9 to \$11 billion to develop, test, and deploy. In January 1999, the administration estimated that an initial system of 20 interceptors would cost about \$10.6 billion. In February 2000, the administration provided a "life-cycle" cost estimate of \$26.6 billion for an initial system of 100 ground-based interceptors in Alaska.

An April 2000 study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), however, estimated that it would cost about \$29.5 billion to develop, build, and operate an initial NMD system through 2015. CBO estimates it will cost another \$19 billion through 2015 to expand the initial system of 100 interceptors and build what was called a Capability 2 and Capability 3 system designed for greater numbers of more sophisticated potential missile threats. According to CBO, additional space-based sensors would bring the total costs for NMD to around \$60 billion through 2015.

Several reports issued by outside groups, however, suggest that the real costs of missile defense deployment could be much higher, perhaps as \$300 billion if such elements as space-based and naval-based NMD interceptors are included.

Trying to put a price tag on missile defense costs is all the more difficult at present because the current administration has not yet determined what sort of missile defense architecture they want to develop. Put simply, they have asked for the credit card to go to the store, but have not told us if they will be buying jeans or a tuxedo, or anything in between.

The question of cost should not be a determining factor in and of itself. If

the international security environment demands development and deployment of missile defenses, the U.S. must go forward regardless of the cost.

But as Congress considers the elements of U.S. national security strategy in the years ahead, it must do so mindful that devoting resources to one area likely means depriving them from another. We must be careful, therefore, to make sure that our national security needs are properly prioritized. To move forward with missile defense, if it is not at the top of the list or immediately needed, and in so doing place in jeopardy other higher and more immediate needs and priorities, such as homeland defense, risks creating an unbalanced and ineffective national security strategy.

The administration's current plans, of what we know about them, seem to suggest that the United States will abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty before we even know if the deployment of NMD is even feasible. And that it would abandon the ABM in pursuit of what can only be considered "unbalanced" national security strategy, one that places too much weight on the development of missile defense, and too little on the other areas, such as prevention, intelligence, rollback, and management, that are equally, or more, important.

The United States must respond to new threats, and defenses can play an important role. But the question is not whether we deploy defenses, as missile defense advocates like to paint it, but what, when, and, most importantly, how.

As I stated earlier, the threat of the proliferation of WMD is real and growing, and how the United States manages this threat should be an overriding security priority. Management requires a comprehensive approach that strikes the right balance between prevention, deterrence, and defense, and the emphasis placed on missile defense must be balanced against other national security priorities. An effective WMD national security strategy must emphasize:

Prevention, through preventive defense and preventive diplomacy, including export controls, regional security commitments, on-going threat reduction programs, and arms control regimes;

Intelligence, including those efforts that show promise for penetrating transnational and terrorist groups that may be planning attacks against the United States or our allies and that illuminate the nature of the proliferation threat;

Rollback of WMD and missile programs that have been developed by other countries, such as the intense diplomacy such as has met with some success on the Korean Peninsula, and a mixture of economic and political incentives; and,

Management of the consequences of proliferation by better protecting our forces, holding open the possibility of pre-emption, and active defenses.